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Russian Twitter disinformation campaigns reach across the 
American political spectrum 
 
Evidence from an analysis of Twitter data reveals that Russian social media trolls exploited racial and 
political identities to infiltrate distinct groups of authentic users, playing on their group identities. The 
groups affected spanned the ideological spectrum, suggesting the importance of coordinated counter-
responses from diverse coalitions of users. 
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RESEARCH QUESTION 
• What authentic audiences did the Internet Research Agency (IRA) interact with, and with what 
messages?  
• To what extent did these audiences share the ideological orientation of the IRA accounts to 
which they replied? 
• Are IRA strategies different for different communities? 
• What strategies might be the most effective to counter IRA activities? 
 
ESSAY SUMMARY   
● The IRA is a private company sponsored by the Russian government, which distributes Kremlin-
friendly disinformation on social media under false identities (see DiResta et al., 2018; Howard, 
Ganesh, Liotsiou, Kelly, & Francois, 2018).  
● The IRA engaged with several distinct communities of authentic users—primarily conservatives, 
progressives, and Black people—which exhibited only minimal overlap on Twitter. 
● Authentic users primarily engaged with IRA accounts that shared their own ideological and/or 
racial identities. 
● Racist stereotyping, racial grievances, the scapegoating of political opponents, and outright false 
statements were four of the most common appeals found among the most replied-to IRA 
tweets. 
 
* A publication of the Shorenstein Center on Media, Politics and Public Policy at Harvard University's John F. 
Kennedy School of Government. 
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● We conducted a network analysis of 2,057,747 authentic replies to IRA tweets over nine years, 
generated ideology ratings for a random sample of authentic users, and qualitatively analyzed 
some of the most replied-to IRA tweets. 
● State-sponsored disinformation agents have demonstrated success in infiltrating distinct online 
communities. Political content attracts far more engagement than non-political content and 
appears crafted to exploit intergroup distrust and enmity.   
● Collaboration between different political groups and communities might be successful in 
detecting IRA campaigns more effectively. 
 
IMPLICATIONS (Why does this matter? And to whom?) 
  
This study’s results support two broad conclusions and two practical implications regarding State-
supported social media disinformation in general and the IRA’s efforts in particular: 
 
Politically active communities present substantial vulnerabilities that disinformation agents can exploit. 
By far, the IRA accounts and content that attracted the most attention were explicitly political in nature. 
In contrast, the organization was less successful in engaging users with its hashtag games, health appeals, 
and general-interest news headlines. This indicates that politically engaged users should be especially 
mindful of attempts by foreign governments and others to co-opt their social media activities for 
surreptitious disinformation purposes.  
 
Our results make it clear that group identity lies at the core of the IRA’s attack strategy. Political audiences 
were addressed as liberals, conservatives, and Black people to provoke anger against oppositional 
outgroups. Each group was paired with a specific set of opponents: the IRA presented conservatives with 
outrages committed by liberals, immigrants, CNN, George Soros, and others; liberals witnessed the 
travesties of the Trump administration, Republicans in general, and evangelical Christians; and Black users 
were confronted with an endless cavalcade of racism, often perpetrated by white police officers. There 
was very little policy-related or even horse-race campaign content to be found—most tweets were 
devoted to vilifying political and social adversaries. Other tweets supported the core group identity in 
affirmative ways, such as conservative tweets celebrating law enforcement and the military and Black 
posts spotlighting Black history and achievements. Individuals who identify as members of targeted 
groups ran a disproportionate risk of exposure to IRA disinformation over the study time period. The 2020 
election may put them in a similar position (Linvill & Warren, 2019).  
 
Facts, inflammatory opinions, and outright falsehoods are all components of a successful disinformation 
playbook. In their typology of IRA Twitter accounts, Linvill and Warren (2018) separate political users on 
the left and right from so-called “Fearmongers” whose main purpose is to spread fabricated news stories. 
Our results reveal that political IRA users also trafficked in falsehoods alongside factual content and 
extreme opinions. While previous research has noted this tendency (Howard et al., 2018), we find false 
content among the ranks of the most widely-discussed tweets, especially on the right. The IRA’s strategy 
of posting about nonexistent events can only be successful if authentic users engage with and spread such 
content at scale. This opens the possibility that it may have had some degree of political impact.  
 
This study’s findings imply that 1) combating State-sponsored disinformation requires cross-ideological 
engagement, and 2) to protect and empower their users, social media platforms need to do more than 
simply delete disinformation messages upon detection. The relative sizes of the communities we detected 
suggest that neither side of the political aisle is immune to foreign disinformation. The ideological breadth 
Freelon, Lokot 3 
of the threat presents opportunities for anti-propaganda collaborations across lines of political difference. 
We have already seen bipartisan efforts to this effect in the US Congress (e.g., US Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence, 2017), but civil society could do more. Because disinformation messages targeted at one 
group are unlikely to be seen by others, members of different targeted groups could coordinate to identify 
and expose suspicious behaviors, perhaps by using private messaging tools. While they may not agree on 
the issues, they should at least be able to identify foreign meddling in domestic elections as a common 
threat. 
 
Social media platforms could also do more to empower their users against foreign manipulation. Both 
Facebook and Twitter’s current policies require that “coordinated inauthentic behavior” be removed 
immediately upon detection. But this practice robs users of opportunities to understand and recognize 
attempts at manipulation in context. Platforms could balance user disinformation education with the 
understandable desire to stop such messages from spreading by:  
 
• Labeling disinformation messages as such,  
• Providing links to supporting evidence for the labels,  
• Showing statistics on how far the account’s messages had spread before detection, 
• and disabling the share and reply functions for such messages.  
 
Policy changes such as these might help users understand how politically polarizing and hostile messages 
are marshaled as nonpartisan weapons of information warfare, and perhaps even discourage them from 
circulating their own such messages. Extensive user testing should be conducted before implementing 
such measures to ensure that they do not backfire by inviting users to believe disinformation content. 
 
FINDINGS  
 
We find that the IRA engaged with several distinct communities of users on Twitter. We used a network 
analysis technique called community detection to determine the sizes of the most popular IRA accounts’ 
respective audiences. A “community” is defined as a group of authentic (non-IRA) users that mostly reply 
to the same popular IRA accounts and only rarely to other accounts. We discovered ten distinct 
communities, all featuring varying degrees of overlap with one another: four devoted to right-wing 
politics, one left-wing and generally anti-Trump, one focused on Black American issues, one focused on 
false news outlets that mostly discussed real news, one devoted to hashtag games (i.e., hashtags that 
pose challenges for users to answer cleverly, such as #ReasonsIAintInARelationship and 
#3wordsBetterThanILoveYou), one about health and diet issues, and one Russian-language community.  
 
Figure 1 is a network visualization of the ten communities. The size of each circle is proportional to the 
number of members within each community—the larger the circle, the more populous the community. 
The lines connecting each circle indicate how many replies crossed community boundaries, with thicker 
lines corresponding to more replies. We found that 47.5% of unique users across all communities were 
placed in one of the four right-wing communities, compared to 16.5% in the Left community, 15.2% in the 
Russian-language community, 14% in the Black community, 2.3% in the News community, 2.2% in the 
Hashtag Gamer community, and 2.2% in the Health and Diet community. 
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Figure 1. Sociogram of IRA network communities. 
 
Each community is anchored by one or more leaders that are responsible for a plurality or majority of 
replies. Table 1 displays the top three of each community’s most prominent leaders and the proportion 
of replies for which each is responsible, out of all replies pointing to community members. Twenty-three 
of the 30 leader accounts are affiliated with the IRA. The remaining seven authentic accounts (highlighted 
in italics) all appear in one of the Right communities. Some authentic accounts were included in these 
communities simply because someone mentioned them, while others actively participated in 
conversations in which IRA accounts were involved. 
 
Community Leader(s) Percent replies to community 
Right 1 @pamela_moore13 27.1% 
@usa_gunslinger 3.5% 
@potus 1.9% 
Right 2 @jenn_abrams 83.4% 
@youtube 0.6% 
@vine 0.2% 
Right 3 @ten_gop 85.5% 
@realdonaldtrump 5.9% 
@anncoulter 0.6% 
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Right 4 @southlonestar 85.5% 
@jk_rowling 0.8% 
@kthopkins 0.8% 
Left @wokeluisa 45.1% 
@kanijjackson 21.5% 
@jemishaaazzz 7.0% 
Black @crystal1johnson 33.3% 
@blacktolive 8.6% 
@blacknewsoutlet 5.3% 
News @chicagodailynew 9.6% 
@dailylosangeles 8.1% 
@seattle_post 4.7% 
Hashtag gamers @giselleevns 18.6% 
@danageezus 9.7% 
@chrixmorgan 5.1% 
Health & diet @exquote 11.7% 
@funddiet 7.5% 
@finddiet 4.6% 
Russian @kadirovrussia 16.7% 
@lavrovmuesli 11.7% 
@margosavazh 8.0% 
Table 1. IRA community leaders. 
 
Most communities exhibited only minimal overlap with one another, except for the conservative 
communities. The other communities that engaged with the IRA’s messages had -in general- minimal 
direct contact with one another. For each community, Figure 2 shows the proportion of replies in which 
both accounts reside within the community out of all those in which at least one account resides within 
the community. The right-wing communities proved the most outward-facing, with three of the four 
sharing most of their replies with other communities. (The Right 3 community included 
@realDonaldTrump, which understandably attracted substantial amounts of attention from other 
communities.) 
 
In contrast, nearly 70% of the replies in which at least one participant was classified as Left or Black 
remained internal. This means that these communities mainly interacted within themselves, overlapping 
minimally with their neighbors. The Russian-language community was by far the most insular, most likely 
due to the language difference.  
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Figure 2. Percent internal replies for IRA network communities. 
  
Our network analysis technique allows us to determine whether authentic users mostly engaged with IRA 
accounts sharing similar identities, or whether they mostly replied to accounts of vastly different 
identities. Our findings strongly favor the former conclusion; in other words, most of the authentic users 
shared the political ideologies of the IRA accounts to which they replied. Figure 3 depicts average ideology 
scores for random samples of 500 unique, authentic users replying to members of each community. The 
ideology scores are on a unidimensional scale in which lower negative values indicate more liberal 
ideologies, and higher positive values indicate more conservative ideologies. (See the Methods section for 
details on how we calculated these scores.) The ideology averages for all four Right communities are right 
of center, while those for Left and Black are left of center. Health & Diet and Hashtag Gamers also have 
left of center averages.  
 
 
Figure 3. Mean ideology scores for IRA network communities. 
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Political IRA accounts were more effective at eliciting reactions than apolitical ones, with identity-specific 
appeals—particularly racial (i.e., invoking race) and racist (i.e., expressing racial animus) ones—frequently 
appearing among the former’s most replied-to tweets. IRA accounts tailored their messages to exploit 
prejudices held by community members against disfavored outgroups. Common targets among 
conservative-presenting IRA accounts’ top tweets included Democrats, Liberals, Antifa, Muslims, 
immigrants/refugees, George Soros, the Black Lives Matter movement, and CNN. Some tweets presented 
inflammatory interpretations of undisputed facts, e.g., “VIDEO: Biker Revs Engine, Drives Through Anti-
Trump Activists Laying in the Street for a 'Die-In' RT if you'd buy the biker a beer!” (@pamela_moore13). 
But others presented false stories as factual, for example, “This is big! Hillary Clinton covered up child 
trafficking investigation at the State Department.” (@ten_gop). Thinly veiled racism was common, often 
manifesting in the form of such outgroup-directed pejoratives as “creeping sharia,” “BLM domestic 
terrorists,” “Muslim no-go zones,” and “illegals,” among others. All four conservative-presenting 
communities used similar tactics, differing from one another mainly in terms of size. 
 
The Left and Black communities also relied heavily on racial appeals, although from an opposite political 
stance from the Right communities. Topically, there was some overlap between the two, with nearly all 
the Black community’s tweets directly addressing race, while this was the case with only some of the Left 
community’s. The Left community’s non-racial tweets typically targeted Trump, his political allies, and 
evangelical Christians, e.g., “RT if you want Mueller to arrest Trump on live TV during the State of the 
Uniom [sic] address #SOTU” (@wokeluisa) and “Michael Flynn (convicted felon) gets a standing ovation 
at a republican fundraising event.  Andrew McCabe (defended America from terrorist threats post 9/11) 
gets fired without a pension.  This is a shining example of what the republican party has become.” 
(@kanijjackson). The IRA leaders of the Black community posted two main types of tweets: first, 
denunciations of racism, e.g., “Ohio cop shatter [sic] windshield of police cruiser with handcuffed black 
man's face. Stop police brutality!” (@blk_voice); and second, apolitical celebrations of Black achievement, 
e.g. “8th grader, Kory Terrell is the Texas Spelling Bee champion! Show him some love. These things go 
unnoticed!” (@crystal1johnson). 
 
The remaining communities deviated sharply from these patterns. While many of the headlines that 
emerged from the News community focused on controversial topics such as guns and immigration, their 
tone was reserved and journalistic, in sharp contrast to the more political communities. The hashtag 
gamers engaged in a mishmash of political, apolitical, and vulgar jokes in reaction to hashtag prompts 
such as #RenameMillionWomenMarch, #IKnewWeWereDoomed, #3WordsBetterThanILoveYou, and 
#ThingsNotToMicrowave. The accounts devoted to health and diet issues remained unswervingly on-
topic, avoiding politics altogether. 
 
Our community detection method collated nearly all the Russian-language accounts into a single 
community. These accounts posted a combination of many of the types of content documented above, 
including divisive political opinions, jokes, news headlines, and historical facts. Many of the tweets voiced 
opposition to the government of Ukraine, a common IRA position noted in prior research (Hjorth & Adler-
Nissen, 2019). One major difference between the Russian-language IRA accounts and their Anglophone 
counterparts is that some of the former parodied or impersonated real people, including Ramzan Kadyrov 
(head of the Chechen Republic) and Sergei Lavrov (Russian foreign affairs minister), whereas none of the 
latter did so. 
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METHODS 
 
We collected our data between October 17 and 19, 2018, using a Twitter data collection program called 
Twint. We searched for all tweets that replied to any screen name on Twitter’s list of 3,814 confirmed IRA 
accounts. A complete list of the screen names we used can be found here:  
https://intelligence.house.gov/uploadedfiles/ira_handles_june_2018.pdf. This process yielded 2,057,747 
tweets posted between May 2009 and October 2018. Fewer than 1% of these tweets appeared prior to 
2014, and almost half (46%) appeared in 2017. Given that we collected our data directly from Twitter in 
real time, we have a high degree of confidence that the true number of authentic replies is no lower than 
this. However, it may be higher, as tweet deletions and account suspensions almost certainly removed 
access to at least some replies. 
 
We used a network community detection algorithm called the Louvain method (Blondel, Guillaume, 
Lambiotte, & Lefebvre, 2008) to generate our communities. We chose to retain the ten largest detected 
communities based on the insight that larger communities are generally more important than smaller 
ones. 92% of all unique users in our dataset were classified into one of these ten communities. We labeled 
the communities based on a qualitative reading of the highest-ranking community members by reply 
count and the content of their tweets. The network visualization in Figure 1 was created with the network 
analysis program Gephi.  
 
To generate mean ideology scores for each community, we used an algorithm that infers political ideology 
based on whom Twitter users follow (Barberá, 2015). Briefly, it uses a list of “elite” users whose ideologies 
are known to estimate the political ideologies of any user who follows at least one of them. The algorithm 
assumes that liberals will tend to follow more liberals, and conservatives will follow more conservatives. 
It produces a unidimensional score in which negative values indicate liberal ideology, positive values 
indicate conservative ideology, and zero indicates a balanced or moderate ideology. Because collecting 
followers for the algorithm to analyze is time-consuming, for each community, we randomly sampled 500 
authentic users who replied to an IRA member. Our initial sample was thus 5,000 (500 users x 10 
communities), but we removed 1,314 users (26.3%) because they did not follow any elites. The ideology 
scores of the remaining 3,686 users (73.7%) were used to compute each community’s mean ideology 
scores. 
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